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This paper discusses the impact of insider ownership on performance for two 
European regions: South and Central Europe. To our knowledge, no prior study has 
made a similar comparison. We confirm that performance increases as the firm’s 
owner sustains its control because the interests of managers and owners are aligned. 
Furthermore we find that insider ownership is more valuable in South European 
countries due to the weaker enforcement of the legal system. However we also 
corroborate that corporate ownership varies in ways consistent with the maximization 
of the firm performance and these inferences may be affected. 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G34 
Keywords: Insider Ownership, Firm Performance, Endogeneity, Europe. 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent studies have analyzed the relationship between ownership and performance in 
Europe (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, and Lisboa, 2007). However, they studied Europe as a 
unit neglecting potentially significant regional specificities namely due to the macro-
economic scenario, institutional characteristics and investors’ legal protection which can lead 
to different impact on performance. In order to verify if the differences across nations are 
related with the system of legal law each country faces, we divided Europe in two mains 
regions: South and Central Europe. The first region includes Portugal, Spain, France, 
Belgium, Italy and Greece, while Germany, Austria and Finland belong to the second region. 
Analyzing the ownership data of these regions over the period between 2000 and 2004, 
we pretend to understand empirical relationships between the ways companies are owned and 
the value they create, and how these relationships can be related to similar developments of 
the financial market. Moreover we want to provide additional evidence of whether the 
differences in legal rules can explain the variations in corporate governance. Finally, we will 
also address the endogeneity problems in order to verify the consistence of our results. 
We find evidence of a linear relationship between insider ownership and performance 
confirming the alignment effect. Therefore, managers may take decisions that lead to the 
firm’s performance maximization and so, as they acquire the company’ shares, the interests of 
both managers and shareholders are aligned. Moreover, we conclude that insider ownership is 
more significant to Southern European countries than to Central European ones. In fact, in 
South Europe the French civil law is dominant and consequently the enforcement of the legal 
law is weaker and investors are poorly protected from expropriation. Likewise, to avoid 
agency conflicts and increase the performance, the firm’s owner needs to use internal 
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mechanisms to control managers such as incentive them to acquire the firm’s shares. In 
Central Europe, where the German and the Scandinavian civil law prevail, the financial 
market is more developed and as a result managers are controlled by external mechanisms 
which limit them to invest in projects that maximize their self interests at the expense of 
shareholders. We also discover that there are other variables such as the firm’s size and 
growth opportunities which influence the performance, and furthermore there may be other 
variables not included in the model that can contribute to explain it. Finally, we address the 
endogeneity problem as previous researchers did and conclude that, as insider ownership is an 
endogenous variable, our results can be affected. In fact, the firm’ manager can be replaced in 
order to maximize the firm performance, which is the main aim of each firm, and 
consequently, not only insider ownership influence performance but the contrary is also true. 
This paper is organized as follows: the theoretical background is present in section 2; 
section 3 documents the theory, hypotheses and model to test them; in section 4 we provide a 
description of the data and methodology; we present the results in section 5, followed by the 
discussion in section 6; and finally the conclusions and paths for future research are evident in 
section 7. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Each individual when decide to create a firm needs to establish contractual relations with 
other investors, employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, and so on. Furthermore he needs 
to decide whether to sustain the firm’s control or to hire a professional manager. Maintaining 
the firm’s control has private benefits, with the production of value to the shareholder, but it 
also generates costs because the shareholder has to acquire information about manager’s 
effort to produce output (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Likewise, some shareholders prefer to 
contract a manager, establishing with him a contract, which Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
define as “agency relationship”; The shareholder who acts as principal hires a person (the 
agent) to control the firm and, to increase his performance, while the agent receives a 
pecuniary salary and some other amenities for doing that job (Demsetz, 1983). With this 
contract, in which the parties define each other’s rights and obligations, their protection and 
the accomplishment of their goals are guaranteed.  
Furthermore, the company’s performance may be affected by manager’s decisions as he 
can use its resources to maximize his wealth at the expense of the firm. If for one side the 
manager receives a salary to do this function in ways consistent with the maximization of the 
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performance, for another side, he may feel not fully compensated for the risk he faces and so 
he can take decisions that satisfy his self-interests, rather than the firm’ ones (Lane et al., 
1999). To avoid a decline of the performance, the shareholder needs to use internal and 
external mechanisms to control managers. One way to align managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders is to incentive them to acquire the firm’ shares. In that case, as managers are at 
the same time shareholders, they may want to maximize the performance. Moreover, there are 
other mechanisms, external mechanisms, which depend on the market force to control 
manager, namely the importance of takeovers, the facility to replace managers, the 
enforcement of the legal law, and others (Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and Ruback, 1983, 
Jensen, 1986, Morck et al., 1989, and Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
 
2.1 Insider Ownership and Performance 
The relationship between insider ownership and performance has been further studied by 
researchers in different national contexts. However, depending on the model defined, 
researchers found different conclusions. The majority of the studies were done to the U.S. and 
the U.K. markets, but there are already some studies from other countries around the world. 
The U.S. and the U.K. have the strongest legal law to protect investors, the common law. In 
these countries, as external mechanisms are important to control managers, insider ownership 
is not as important as it is in countries with civil law. Some researchers confirm that at low 
levels of insider ownership the performance increases because the interests of managers and 
shareholders are aligned and consequently the agency problems between the principal and the 
agent are avoided. However, after a certain level, as managers retain more of the firm’ shares 
they can create a board difficult to monitor or even stay on the job when they are not 
competent or qualified for it, leading to a decline in the performance (Demsetz, 1983, Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, Faccio et al., 2001, Anderson et al., 2003). This quadratic relationship was 
found by Stulz (1988), McConnel and Servaes (1990), and Han and Suk (1998), who find a 
maximum at a level around 40-50 percent of insider ownership to the U.S. market and by 
Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) who find a maximum at 11 percent of insider ownership in the 
U.K. market. However, others researchers discovered a cubic relationship. Additionally to the 
previous conclusions, some researchers found that at higher levels of insider ownership, as the 
manager and the shareholder are the same person, the interests of both are aligned again and 
so the performance increases. This cubic relationship was confirmed by Morck et al. (1988), 
Cho (1998), and Holderness et al. (1999) to the U.S. market, and by Short and Keasey (1999), 
and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) to the U.K. It is important to refer that the maximum point 
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found in the U.S. market is around 5-7 percent of insider ownership, which is different from 
the previous results found from the same country. This situation can be related with the 
database used, the structure of the sample analyzed, the model defined, the type of companies 
studied, around others. To other countries, which are mostly characterized by having civil 
law, the relationship found between insider ownership and performance is diverse. While 
Miguel et al. (2004) found a cubic relationship to Spain, Morck et al. (2000), and Lisboa 
(2007) found a positive and linear relationship to Japan and to Europe, respectively. Kumar 
(2003) confirmed a quadratic relationship to India. Likewise, we can conclude that insider 
ownership is significant to determine the firm performance but we can not affirm which is its 
impact as there are many reasons that can influence it. 
 
2.2 Endogeneity 
If the main aim of the shareholder is to maximize the firm performance, he can replace the 
manager in order to achieve it. Likewise, not only insider ownership can influence 
performance, but the contrary can be also true and in this case the results found by researchers 
who analyze this relationship can be spurious. Some researchers as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalong (2001) suggested that 
ownership variables are endogenously determined in equilibrium. In fact, investors can 
rearrange their portfolio in order to maximize the firm and their own wealth. Especially in 
countries where replace managers is an easy task, insider ownership can quickly change. 
Moreover, is easier to remove a professional manager than an owner-manager from its 
position (Hillier and McColgan, 2005, and Hermalin, 2005). It may also be complex to reach 
a common agreement on corporate structure modifications. Consequently, if on one hand it is 
logic for the ownership structure to change over time in order to satisfy investors’ main aim, 
on the other hand investors’ inertia blocs the firm portfolio rearrangement.  
 
2.3 Legal Law and Performance 
According to La Porta et al. (1998) the differences in investors’ legal protection can 
explain the variations about how firms are financed and owned. Moreover, some researchers, 
as La Porta et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2003), and Albuquerque and Wang (2008), found a 
positive relationship between the firm value and investor protection, since in this case 
minorities’ wealth expropriation is avoided. Dahya et al. (2008) also conclude that, especially 
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in countries with weak legal law to protect investors, the firm corporate value increases when 
the board is made up of directors not affiliated with the major shareholder. 
There are different legal law systems around the world. The civil law is the most 
influential and more familiar around the world, but is also the weakest law. It can be divided 
into French, German and Scandinavian origin. French civil law is familiar in Argentina, 
Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. In 
these countries minorities are not protected neither there are creditors. To surpass these 
problems mandatory dividends are defined in the majority of the countries. Moreover, not 
only legal rules but also the quality of its enforcement is weak, and so managers can abuse 
from their importance in the firm by expropriating investors (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Consequently, concentrated control is needed to avoid these expropriations and to increase the 
performance. For another side, German civil law is in the middle of common and French civil 
law. Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan are countries with this 
legal system. In these countries minorities are not protected by law, but creditors are secured. 
Moreover the enforcement of the legal law is a substitute of the weak rules. Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden are countries with Scandinavian civil law, which have the better 
quality of law enforcement to surpass the weak rules to protect investors (La Porta et al., 1998 
and 2000). Furthermore, comparing with the previous legal systems, investors in countries 
with this legal system are the most protected by law as well as creditors. Likewise, the 
concentration of ownership is not required to increase performance, since the interests 
between the principal and the agent are aligned due to the market for control and discipline 
managers’ actions. Finally, the rest of the countries have a common law system, which is the 
law that better protect investors, minorities and creditors. As a result, in these countries the 
ownership structure of the firms is characterized by diverse minority investors who normally 
contract a professional manager to control the firm.  
 
3. Theory, Hypothesis and Model 
3.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
Initially we hypothesize that the differences in the relationship between insider ownership 
and performance around Europe are related with the country legal law. Additionally we 
address the endogeneity problem in order to confirm the robustness of the results. 
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3.1.1 Insider Ownership and Performance 
As managers are the responsible for the definition of the firm’s strategy and investments, 
they influence its performance. As Lisboa (2007) found a positive and linear relationship 
between insider ownership and performance in Europe we expect to find the same type of 
relationship. However the power of the relationship may depend on the country legal law and 
its enforcement to protect investors. While in countries with French civil law insider 
ownership is important to align the interests of managers and shareholders, in countries with 
Germany and Scandinavian origin investors are more protected by law from expropriation and 
so insider ownership is not a necessary mechanism to control managers’ actions. 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between firm performance and insider ownership is more 
relevant in South European countries than in Central European ones. 
 
3.1.2 Endogeneity 
We addressed the endogeneity problem in order to verify if the results found in this study 
are consistent. The importance of endogeneity and simultaneity was stated by several 
researchers when analyzing the influence of ownership on performance (Demsetz, 1983, 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Cho, 1998, Himmelberg et al., 1999, and Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). Investors can rearrange their portfolio, changing managers, in order to increase the 
firm performance. Likewise, not only insider ownership influence performance but the 
contrary can be also true and in this case our results can be false. However, find an agreement 
to change corporate ownership may be difficult to achieve and so shareholders’ inertia can 
prevail. Besides, it is not easier to remove an owner-manager from his position (Hillier and 
McColgan, 2005, and Hermalin, 2005). In this case insider ownership may be an exogenous 
variable, which validate our previous results. 




To test the first hypothesis we will use the Ordinary Least Square method, and then to 
address the endogeneity we will use the Two Stages Least Square estimation.  
 
3.2.1 Insider Ownership and Performance 
The first hypothesis will be test using a linear relationship between insider ownership and 
performance in order to validate the alignment effect (equation 1). We make the test for each 
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one of the groups we pretended to analyze. Moreover, following the studies of researchers 
such as Himmelberg et al. (1999), Kumar (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004) four control 
variables were included: firm’s size, age, growth opportunities, and debt intensity. 
ititititititit DebtGOAgeSizeIOePerformanc εγγγγα +++++= 43211    (1) 
 
3.2.2 Endogeneity 
Finally, the relationship between insider ownership and performance is examined, in order 
to check whether it is a spurious one, injected by omitted variables. To do so, two equations 
will be estimated simultaneously (equation 2 and 3).  
ititititititit DebtGOAgeSizeIOePerformanc εγγγγα +++++= 43211   (2) 
ititititititit DebtGOAgeSizeePerformancIO εγγγγρ +++++= 43211   (3) 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
The sample includes all companies included in the WorldScope and Reuters database 
from 9 European Continental countries. We separate the countries into two groups attending 
to the origin of the legal law. The South European group (which has 409 firms) is composed 
of Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, Italy and Greece, countries where the French civil 
law is familiar. The other group, Central Europe (which has 444 firms) is formed by 
Germany, Austria and Finland that are countries with German and Scandinavian civil law.  
47,95%52,05%
South Europe Central Europe
 
Picture 1: Structure of the Sample 
 




To analyze the relationship between insider ownership and performance, we did not only 
use variables related to insider ownership and with performance, but we also included some 
control variables as they may influence the relationship in study.  
 
4.2.1. Ownership Variables 
The variable insider ownership (IO) was measured as the percentage of ownership held 
by the Chief Executive Officer, the Chairman and the Vice-chairman of the board and the 
Executive Director. This information was collected on Reuters database. 
 
4.2.2. Firms’ Performance Variables 
To measure the performance we used the variable Return on Assets (ROA) which is an 
accounting-measure that evaluates the efficiency with which corporate assets are managed. 
This variable was obtained directly from DataStream’s item of ROA.  
 
4.2.3. Control Variables 
As we referred before we include some control variables related with the firm’ 
characteristics in order to better explain the relationship between insider ownership and 
performance. All these variables where directly taken or constructed using information from 
the DataStream database. 
 Size: to measure the firm’ size we use the natural logarithm of the company’s sales (ln 
Sale). We include this variable because it may influence the performance. If for one 
side larger firms have more difficulty in controlling all their activities, which can lead 
to agency problems and consequently to a decline in the performance, for another side 
they can benefit from economies of scale and better knowledge about the market, 
increasing the performance. 
 Age: to measure the firm’s age we count the number of years between the firm’s 
foundation and the year in analysis. One more time, the firm’s age has an ambiguous 
effect on performance because older firms can benefit from better knowledge, 
experience and reputation but can also be more inflexible which leads to a decline in 
the performance.  
 Growth Opportunities (GO): are measured using year-over-year sales. As the growth 
opportunities increases the firm may be more innovative and can improve its 
efficiency. Moreover, when there are few growth opportunities managers can make 
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investments that maximize their self-interest at the expense of the company’s value 
maximization, leading to a decline in the performance. 
 Debt Intensity (Debt): is measured dividing the level of debt over total assets. We use 
this variable because firms with higher levels of debt tend to have better performance 




To measure the linear relationship between two quantitative variables and to identify 
potential problems of multicolinearity we used the Pearson R correlation.  
Table 1: Correlation Matrix for the South European region 
 ROA IO Age Size GO Debt 
ROA  1.0000      
IO 0.1226  1.0000     
Age -0.0338 -0.1507  1.0000    
Size 0.0805 -0.1086 0.3094  1.0000   
GO 0.9332 0.0823 -0.0491 0.0206  1.0000  
Debt -0.0170 -0.0706 0.1336 0.1749 -0.0130  1.0000 
The variables are the following: ROA- Return on Assets, IO- percentage of insider ownership, 
Age- firm age, Size- firm size, GO- growth opportunities, Debt- debt intensity 
The table 1 reports the correlation matrix for the South European region. The variable 
ROA and GO are highly correlated (Pearson R = 0.9332), which means that as the variable 
ROA increases the firm’s opportunity to grow also raise, and vice versa. 0.3094 is the 
correlation between size and age, indicating that the older firms are normally larger than the 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix for the Central European region 
 ROA IO Age Size GO Debt 
ROA  1.0000      
IO 0.0874  1.0000     
Age 0.2125 -0.1046  1.0000    
Size 0.2821 -0.0585 0.3884  1.0000   
GO 0.0781 -0.0241 -0.0282 -0.0732  1.0000  
Debt 0.1267 0.0225 0.0597 0.1527 -0.0264  1.0000 
The variables are the following: ROA- Return on Assets, IO- percentage of insider ownership, 
Age- firm age, Size- firm size, GO- growth opportunities, Debt- debt intensity 
The variables’ correlations for the Central European region are reported in table 2. As we 
have stated before the variable firm’s age and size are positively correlated (Pearson R = 
0.3884). Moreover none of the remaining variables are correlated to a significant extent. 
 
5.2 The Regional Impact 
Additionally, we compare the medium value of the variable ROA, which measures the 
firm performance, in order to verify if there are significant differences between the two 
regions. We also divided each region in companies with insider ownership and in firms where 
manager and shareholders are separate. The results are shown in table 3. 
Table 3: medium ROA 






With IO 6.566 196 0.373 149 
Without IO 1.813 213 0.670 295 
Difference 4.752 - -0.296 - 
All sample 4.091 409 0.570 444 
 
In both regions there are more firms with separation of ownership and control than firms 
where the owner is also its manager, although in South Europe the difference is not so 
relevant. This indicates that the majority of shareholders look for a professional manager to 
control the firm in order to benefit from his better knowledge about the job and the market, 
which can lead to the performance maximization. Moreover, as we expected in South 
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European countries the performance is higher in firms where insider ownership is present due 
to the alignment effect between shareholders and managers. Conversely, to Central European 
countries, the situation is the opposite as firms with professional managers have a higher 
performance than the remaining firms. In fact, since the market for corporate control is more 
effective in this region, and investors enjoy better legal protection, the internal mechanisms to 
avoid agency conflicts between the agent and the principal are not as important as in French 
civil law countries. Likewise, the legal law influences the corporate ownership of the firms. 
 
5.3 Regression Results 
5.3.1. Insider Ownership and Performance 
 
To analyze the relationship between insider ownership and performance and test our first 
hypothesis we make a regression of the performance, measured by the variable ROA, against 
insider ownership. The results of the cross-sectional Ordinary Least Square Regression of 
each of the two groups of countries are displayed in table 4. 
Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of ROA and insider ownership 
 South Europe Central Europe 
C -8.9180 *** -25.9451 *** 
IO 5.5546 *** 8.9364 ** 
Age 0.0001  0.2618 *** 
Size 0.8812 *** 1.7975 *** 
GO 1.6764 *** 0.5455 **  
Debt -0.0199 0.0747 * 
R2 87.75% *** 12.24% *** 
Log Likelihood -1471.900 -1832.967 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
87.75 percent (R2) of the performance of South European companies is explained by the 
model described. As we expect, insider ownership affect positively and significantly the firm 
performance, which means that as managers acquire the firm’ shares, the interests of owners 
and managers are aligned and so the performance increases. We also confirm that the 
variables size and growth opportunities positively affect the performance at 1 percent level of 
significance. May be there are other variables, different from the ones used in the model, 
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which explain the performance, as for example the law, the macroeconomic scenario and the 
industry’s influence.  
Analyzing the firms from Central European countries, we verified that insider ownership 
also positively and significantly affects the performance, at 5 percent of level o significance. 
However the model described only explains 12.24 percent of the variable ROA. Additionally, 
the firm’s age and size influence the performance at 1 percent of level of significance, GO at 
5 percent and debt at 10 percent. Finally, other variables not included in the model can also 
help to explain the performance in a negative way. 
Furthermore, we confirm our first hypothesis which states that the relationship between 
performance and insider ownership is more relevant in South European countries than in 
Central European ones. In fact, there are differences in the performance of European 
companies. In South European countries the concentration of ownership and control is more 
familiar as investors are poorly protected by law. Likewise managers are incentive to acquire 
the firm’ shares in order to the interests of owners and managers become aligned and to avoid 
the investors’ wealth expropriation. For another side, in Central European countries the 
judicial system is more efficient, which award to investors’ protection. Consequently, as the 
market is more developed, investors do not need to sustain the firm’s control, but there are 
some external mechanisms which gives them more welfare. 
 
5.3.2. Endogeneity 
To test our second hypothesis we apply the Two Least Square Regression by estimating in 
simultaneously the equation 2 and 3. The results are shown in table 5. 
Table 5: Two Least Squares regressions of ROA and insider ownership 
 South Europe Central Europe 
C 0.3422 *** 0.1856 ** 
ROA 0.0039 *** 0.0017 ** 
Age -0.0039 ** -0.0029 ** 
Size -0.0112 * -0.0057 
GO -0.0052 ** -0.0028 
Debt -0.0005 0.0002 
R2 5.55% *** 2.77% ** 
Instrument list: ROA, C, IO, Age, Size, GO, Debt 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 




Contrary to our expectations insider ownership is not an exogenous variable. In fact, we 
confirm the same results as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) who state 
that not only insider ownership influences performance but the contrary is also true. This 
means that the corporate ownership varies in ways consistent with performance maximization. 
Likewise there may be other instruments than insider ownership that the shareholder can use 
to align his incentives with those of managers. In fact, when the firm’s performance falls short 
of expectations, the shareholder can replace the manager in order to maximize his wealth. 
Consequently, our previous results may be affected. 
Furthermore, in South European countries, insider ownership is predominant in young and 
small firms with few growth opportunities. These firms have a relatively high failure risk 
because their survival is threatened by the few opportunities to invest in innovative projects. 
The manager/owner tends to preserve the firm’s control to avoid the agency conflicts and 
declining performance, giving the firm the equilibrium it needs to grow. Moreover the owner 
may have difficulty in finding a professional manager who might overburden the firm’s 
limited financial resources. In Central European countries only the young firms are important 
to explain insider ownership, since shareholders are trying to acquire more information about 
the firm and the market. Finally, there may be others unobserved variables which can explain 
insider ownership in Europe. 
 
6. Discussion 
Consistently with Morck et al. (2000) and Lisboa (2007), we found a positive and 
significant relationship between insider ownership and performance, which means that as 
managers acquire the firm’ shares their interests are aligned with those of shareholders and 
consequently, as agency conflicts are avoided, the firm performance increases. Moreover, we 
divided Europe into two regions attending to legal and environmental specificities. The first 
region, called South Europe, includes Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy and Greece, 
where French civil law is predominant. The second region - Central Europe - includes 
Germany, Austria and Finland, countries with a legal system with German and Scandinavian 
roots. We found evidence that insider ownership is more significant in South European 
countries because as the enforcement of the legal system is weaker, investors need to look for 
internal mechanism to control managers. In fact, in these countries not only investors, but also 
creditors enjoy a weak legal protection, allowing managers’ wealth expropriation with a 
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negative impact on firm performance. Insider ownership was found as an efficient institution 
to circumvent this problem, only in the South Europe region. By contrast, the better legal 
protection predominant in Central Europe rendered this institutional mode more costly than 
the inherent benefits. Better legal protection and more efficient financial markets provide 
efficient and economical tools to control managers’ actions. Likewise, shareholders in Central 
European countries do not need to sustain the firm’s control but can look for a professional 
manager which may have a better knowledge about the market and the job, leading to an 
increase in the performance. Finally, we address the endogeneity problem and concluded that 
not only insider ownership influence performance but the contrary is also true. Furthermore, 




7.1 Main Results 
Our results illustrate that insider ownership influences the firm performance in a positive 
way, due to the alignment effect of the interests of both shareholders and managers. 
Additionally we prove that the origin of the legal law is important to explain that influence. In 
countries with a French legal system, as investors are poorly protect by law, insider ownership 
is an important mechanism to control managers’ actions and so the performance increases 
when shareholders and managers are the same person because it guarantees a coincidence of 
the interests of both. By contrast, the legal system of Central European countries provides a 
better protection from expropriation. Therefore, shareholders do not need to use internal 
mechanisms to control managers, leaving that task to more efficient financial markets. 
However, these inferences may be affected since insider ownership is an endogenous variable, 
which means that shareholders can replace the firm’s manager in order to increase the firm 
performance. 
 
7.2 Study’ limitations 
Since there is limited information about the firms’ ownership, we could not use all firms 
from the Worldscope database, as we expected. The final number of firms was substantially 
reduced to match the ownership information from Reuters Database. 
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7.3 Suggestions for further analysis 
For future analysis we propose to analyze the relationship between family and non family 
firms and performance in order to understand if there are substantial differences among them. 
In fact, shareholders of family firms pretend to pass the firm onto the next generations and 
consequently they need to sustain the firm’ presence in the market (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). Likewise, it seems that family business leads to an increase of the performance. 
However, these shareholders are also more prone to be risk averse and so they may invest in 
more conservative projects in detriment of the firm performance. 
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